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What ? 
• New schemes for backup of encryption 
keys entrusted to an Escrow 
–  Collectively called RENS Schemes 
–They backup high quality encryption 
keys 
•AES (256b), DH 500+b… 
• Backup itself is specifically encrypted 
•  Unlike a traditional simple key copy 
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What ? 
• Fast brute-force recovery remains 
possible 
– In the absence of key owner 
– Within the timing wished by the 
recovery requestor 
• But only over a large cloud 
1K – 100K nodes 
3 
What ? 
• Unwelcome recovery is unlikely  
–E.g. could easily take, say, 70 or even 
700 days at escrow’s processor alone 
– Illegal use of a large cloud is 
implausible 
•Cloud providers  do best to prevent it 
• Easily noticeable if ever starts 
–Follow the money 
• Leaves compromising traces in numerous 
logs 
 
6 
Why 
• High quality key loss danger is 
Achilles’ heel of modern crypto 
–Makes many folks refraining of 
any encryption 
–Other loose many tears if 
unthinkable happens 
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Why 
• If you create key copies… 
–  Every copy increases danger of 
disclosure 
–For an Escrow,  her/his copy is an 
obvious temptation 
–  Some Escrows may not resist to   
• In short users face the dilemma: 
  Key loss or disclosure ? That is The 
Question 
•    8 
Why 
• RENS schemes alleviate this 
dilemma  
• Easily available large clouds 
make them realistic 
• Our schemes should benefit  
numerous applications 
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How (Overview) : Key Owner Side 
• Key owner or client chooses 
inhibitive timing of 1-node (brute-
force) recovery  
– Presumably unwelcome at 
escrow’s site alone  
–E.g. 70 days 
– Or 700 days for less trusted escrows 
–  Or anything between 
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How : Key Owner Side 
• Consequently , the owner fixes a 
large integer  
–Called backup encryption complexity 
or hardness 
•  Actually, this step may be 
programmed  
– The backup encryption agent on 
client node may be in charge of 
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How : Key Owner Side 
• Key owner or the agent creates 
the shared noised secret 
– Some share(s) of the actual 
secret become noised shares  
–« Burried » among very many 
look-alike but fake noise shares 
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How : Key Owner Side 
• The only way to recognize 
whether a noise share is a noised 
one is to try out its « footprint » 
• The owner/agent creates the 
footprint for each noised share 
• Each footprint is unique 
• Remember Cinderella ? 
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How : Key Owner Side 
• Key owner/agent sends the noised 
secret to Escrow  
• Noised secret is the backup 
– Guess your key by its print in this 
mess (inspired by CSIS actual ex.) 
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How (Overview) : Escrow Side 
• Key requestor  asks Escrow  to recover 
data in acceptable max  recovery time   
–E.g. 10 min 
• Escrow’s server sends the time and all 
but one shares of the noised secret 
to the cloud 
• Intruder to the cloud cannot find the 
key 
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How : Escrow’s Side 
• RENS scheme executed at the cloud 
chooses the cloud size  
–To fit the calculus time limit for sure  
– Say  10K nodes 
• Search for the noised share gets  
partitioned over the nodes  
• Nodes work in parallel  
– Matching the “footprints” 16 
How : Escrow’s Side 
• Every lucky node reports back to 
Escrow the noised share found 
• Escrow’ server recovers the key from 
all the shares 
– Using the clasical XORing  
• Sends the recovered key to 
Requestor 
–Not forgetting the bill 
17 
What Else ? 
• Well, everything is in details   
–Client Side Encryption 
–Server Side Recovery 
•Static Scheme 
•Scalable Scheme 
–Related Work 
–Conclusion 
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What Else ? 
• More  :  
–Res. Rep. 
http://www.lamsade.dauphine.fr/~litwin/Recoverabl
e%20Encryption_10.pdf 
– S. Jajodia, W. Litwin & Th. Schwarz. 
Recoverable Encryption through a Noised 
Secret over a Large Cloud.  
•  5th Inl. Conf. on Data Management in Cloud, 
Grid and P2P Systems (Globe 2012 )  
•  Publ. Springer Verlag, Lecture Notes in Comp.   
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Client Side (Backup) Encryption 
• Client X backs up  encryption key S 
• X estimates 1-node inhibitive time 
D 
–Say 70 days 
• D measures trust to Escrow 
–Lesser trust ?  
•  Choose 700 days  
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Client Side Encryption 
• D determines minimal cloud size N for 
future recovery in any acceptable time R   
–Chosen by recovery requestor 
• E.g. 10 min   
–X expects N > D / R  but also N  D / R   
•  E.g. N  10K  for D = 70 days 
– N  100K  for D = 700 days 
21 
Client Side Encryption 
• X creates a classical shared secret for S 
–S is seen as a large integer,  
• E.g., 256b long for AES 
–Basically, X creates a 2-share secret  
–Share s0  is a random integer 
–  Share s1  is calculated as s1 = s0
 XOR S  
• Common knowledge: 
–  S = s0
 XOR s1  
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Client Side Encryption 
• X transforms the shared secret into a noised one 
– X makes s0  a noised share : 
• Chooses  a 1-way hash H 
– E.g.  SHA 256 
• Computes the hint  h = H (s0) 
– Chooses the noise space  
I = 0,1…,m,…M-1 
– For some large M determined as we explain  
soon  
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Client-Side Encryption 
– Each noise m and s0  define a noise share s 
• In a way  we show soon as well 
– There are M different pseudo random 
noise shares 
• All but one are different from s0 
• But it is not known which one is s0  
– The only way to find for any s whether  
s = s0
 is to attempt the match   
  H (s) ?= h  
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Shared Secret / Noised (Shared) Secret 
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Client Side Encryption 
• X estimates the 1-node throughput T  
– # of match attempts H (s) ?= h per 
time unit 
•1 Sec by default 
• X sets M to M = Int (DT). 
– M should be 240 ÷ 250 in  practice 
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Client Side Encryption 
• X randomly chooses  m  I = [0,1…M[ 
• Calculates base noise share f = s0 – m 
• Defines noised share s0
n = (f, M, h).  
• Sends the noised secret S’ = (s0
n, s1) to 
Escrow as the backup 
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Escrow-Side Recovery (Backup  Decryption)  
• Escrow E receives legitimate request of S 
recovery in time R at most 
• E chooses between static or scalable 
recovery schemes 
• E sends data S” = (s0
n, R) to some cloud 
node with request for processing 
accordingly 
–Keeps s1 out of the cloud   
28 
Recovery Processing Parameters 
• Node load Ln : # of  noises among M 
assigned to node n for match attempts 
• Throughput Tn : # of match attempts node  
n can process / sec 
• Bucket (node) capacity Bn : # of match 
attempts node  n can process  / time R 
–Bn = R Tn 
• Load factor n = Ln / Bn 
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Node Load 
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Recovery Processing Parameters 
• Notice the data storage oriented 
vocabulary 
• Node n respects R iff n  ≤ 1 
–Assuming T constant during the processing 
• The cloud respects R if for every n we 
have n  ≤ 1 
• This is our goal  
–For both static and scalable schemes we 
now present 
 
 
31 
Static Scheme 
32 
• Intended for a homogenous Cloud 
– All nodes provide the same throughput 
Static Scheme : Init Phase 
• Node C that got S” from E becomes 
coordinator    
• Calculates a (M)  = M / B (C)   
–Usually  (M) >> 1 
• Defines N as a (M)  
–Implicitly considers the cloud as 
homogenous 
• E.g.,  N = 10K or N = 100K in our ex.   
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Static Scheme : Map Phase 
• C  asks for allocation of N-1 nodes     
• Associates logical address n = 1, 2…N-1 
with each new node & 0 with itself 
• Sends out to every node n data (n, a0, P)   
–a0  is its own physical address, e.g., IP 
–P specifies Reduce phase 
34 
Static Scheme : Reduce Phase 
• P requests node n to attempt matches for 
every noise share s = (f + m) such that  
n = m mod N 
• In practice, e.g., while m < M:  
–Node 0 loops over noise m = 0, N, 2N… 
• So over the noise shares f, f + N, f + 2N… 
–Node 1 loops over noise m = 1, N+1, 2N+1… 
–….. 
–Node N – 1 loops over m = (your guess here) 
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Static Scheme : Node Load 
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Static Scheme 
• Node n that gets the successful match 
sends s to C 
• Otherwise node n enters Termination  
• C asks every node to terminate 
–  Details depend on actual cloud   
• C forwards s as s0 to E 
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Static Scheme 
• E discloses the secret S and sends S to 
Requestor 
– Bill included (we guess)  
• E.g., up to 400$ on CloudLayer for  
–D = 70 days 
–R = 10 min 
– Both implied N = 10K with private 
option  
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Static Scheme 
• Observe that  N ≥ D / R and N  D / R  
–  If the initial estimate of T by S owner holds 
• Observe also that for every node n, we have 
(n) ≤ 1 
• Under our assumptions maximal recovery 
time is thus indeed R 
• Average recovery time is R / 2      
–Since every noise share is equally likely to 
be the lucky one 39 
Static Scheme 
• See papers for  
–Details,  
–Numerical examples  
– Proof of correctness 
•The scheme really partitions I 
•Whatever is N and s0, one and 
only one node finds s0   
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Static Scheme 
•  Safety 
–No disclosure method can in practice 
be faster than the scheme 
–Dictionary attack, inverted file of 
hints… 
• Other properties 
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Scalable Scheme 
• Heterogeneous cloud 
– Node throughputs may differ 
42 
Scalable Scheme 
• Intended for heterogenous clouds 
–  Different node throughputs 
–  Basically only locally known 
•  E.g.  
–Private or hybrid cloud 
–Public cloud without so-called private 
node option      
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Scalable Scheme 
• Init phase similar up to  (M) calculus 
–  Basically  (M) >> 1  
–  Also we note it now 0 
• If  > 1 we say that node overflows 
• Node 0 sets then its level j to j = 0 and 
splits  
– Requests node 2j = 1 
– Sets j to j = 1  
– Sends to node 1, (S”, j, a0)   
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Scalable Scheme 
• As result  
–There are N = 2 nodes 
–  Both have j = 1 
–Node 0 and node 1 should each process M / 2 
match attempts 
•  We show precisely how on next slides 
– Iff both 0 and 1 are no more than 1 
• Usually it should not be the case 
•  The splitting should continue as follows  
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Scalable Scheme 
• Recursive rule 
–  Each node n splits until  n ≤ 1 
–  Each split increases node level jn to jn + 1  
–  Each split creates new node n’ = n + 2jn  
–  Each node n’ gets jn’ = jn initially 
• Node 0 splits thus perhaps into nodes 1,2,4…  
• Until 0 ≤ 1 
• Node 1 starts with j= 1 and splits into nodes 
3,5,9… 
• Until 1 ≤ 1 
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Scalable Scheme 
• Node 2 starts with j = 2 and splits into 
6,10,18…  
• Until 2 ≤ 1 
• Your general rule here  
• Node with smaller T splits more times 
and vice versa 
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Scalable Scheme : Splitting 
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Scalable Scheme 
• If cloud is homogenous, the address 
space is contiguous 
• Otherwise, it is not 
–  No problem 
–  Unlike for a extensible or linear hash 
data structure 
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Scalable Scheme : Reduce phase 
• Every node n attempts matches for every 
noise k  [0, M-1] such that n = k mod 2jn.   
• If node 0 splits three times, in Reduce 
phase it attempts to match noised shares 
(f + k) with k = 0, 8, 16… 
• If node 1 splits four times, it attempts to 
match noised shares (f + k) with k = 1, 17, 
33… 
• Etc. 
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Scalable Scheme : Reduce Phase 
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Scalable Scheme 
• N ≥ D / R 
– If S owner initial estimate holds     
• For homogeneous cloud it is 30% 
greater on the average and twice as 
big at worst / static scheme 
• Cloud cost may still be cheaper 
– No need for private option 
• Versatility may still make it 
preferable besides 
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Scalable Scheme 
• Max recovery time is up to R 
–  Depends on homogeneity of the cloud 
• Average recovery time is up to R /2 
• See again the papers for  
–  Examples  
–  Correctness 
–  Safety 
–  … 
–Detailed perf. analysis remains future work 
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Related Work 
• RE scheme for outsourced LH* files   
• CSCP scheme for outsourced LH* records 
sharing 
• Crypto puzzles 
• One way hash with trapdoor 
• 30-year old excitement around Clipper 
chip 
• Botnets 
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Conclusion 
• Key safety is Achilles’ heel of 
cryptography 
• Key loss or key disclosure ? That is The 
Question 
• RENS schemes alleviate the dilemma  
• Future work Deeper formal analysis 
–Proof of concept implementation 
–Variants 
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